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Abstract 
Despite the comparatively few cases of Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) that arose outside of Sierra Leone, Guinea, and 
Liberia in 2014, public health response partners around the world developed a patchwork of plans and policies to 
monitor thousands of people exposed to EVD, quarantine suspected cases, isolate confirmed cases, and close borders 
to prevent further spread of the disease. Deeply affected countries such as Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia, as well as 
less affected countries such as the United States, Canada, and Australia developed special guidance regarding isola-
tion and quarantine measures for EVD. The massive and well-publicized EVD response highlighted international chal-
lenges of public health laws and policies, many of which remain largely unchanged since their implementation. This 
article examines public health measures, including health surveillance and decedent disposition, and their effects on 
isolation and quarantine practices in six countries (Sierra Leone, Guinea, Liberia, United States, Canada, and Australia) 
in context of the 2014–2015 EVD response, and makes recommendations.
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Background
Isolation and quarantine are measures used in public 
health response in order to control the spread of com-
municable and infectious diseases. Isolation is the act of 
separating sick people with a contagious disease from 
people who are not sick. Quarantine is the separating 
and restricting of the movement of people who were 
exposed to a contagious disease in case they become sick 
[1]. These measures played a prominent role in the EVD 
response in 2014, and many other factors, such as health 
surveillance and the disposition of the dead, along played 
a role in the way isolation and quarantine measures were 
developed and enforced. This article aims to discuss these 
policies and interactions during the EVD response.
There are many law articles and studies analyzing the 
policies and response of the international and domestic 
community during the EVD response. Each country also 
had existing laws and policies regarding isolation and 
quarantine that have a long history behind them. The 
article takes these sources into account as well as real 
time accounts and documentaries regarding the EVD 
crisis.
Introduction
The 2014–2015 West Africa Ebola Virus Disease (EVD) 
outbreak is the largest in history. As of June 10, 2016, 
the World Health Organization (WHO) reported a total 
of 28,616 cases (suspected, probable, and confirmed) 
and 11,310 deaths, most of which emerged in Sierra 
Leone, Guinea, and Liberia [2] (collective population 
of approximately 290 million people). Nigeria and Mali 
each reported small numbers of cases, and single cases 
occurred in Senegal, Spain, Italy, and the United King-
dom. Additionally, the United States reported eight 
imported cases, including two deaths, and two locally 
acquired cases in healthcare workers [3].
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Despite the comparatively few cases that arose out-
side of Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia, public health 
response partners around the world developed a patch-
work of plans and policies to monitor thousands of 
people exposed to EVD, quarantine suspected cases, 
and isolate confirmed cases to prevent further spread 
of the disease. WHO developed strategies and poli-
cies to combat the spread of EVD that rejected blanket 
travel bans and emphasized education, but ultimately 
WHO lacks enforcement authority [4, 5] to ensure the 
uniform implementation of its recommendations or a 
seamless international response. The varied, massive, 
and well-publicized response highlighted challenges 
internationally in public health laws and policies, 
many of which remain largely unchanged since their 
implementation. This article examines public health 
measures, including health surveillance and decedent 
disposition, and their effects on isolation and quaran-
tine practices in six countries (Sierra Leone, Guinea, 
Liberia, United States, Canada, and Australia) in con-
text of the 2014–2015 EVD response, and makes 
recommendations.
Review
Survey of international EVD response
Guinea, Liberia, and Sierra Leone:
For me, the worst is quarantine: it means prison. 
Can you imagine? There is no war but men with 
guns and uniforms stand outside the homes of your 
friends. One day, there were soldiers outside my own 
house.
Bintu Sannoh, a Sierra Leonean on forced quaran-
tines [6]
The constitutions of Guinea, Sierra Leone, and Liberia 
allow for a wide range of emergency response measures 
to protect the public’s health during emergencies [7]. 
Though all three constitutions grant certain public rights, 
such as freedoms of assembly and association, only Guin-
ea’s constitution explicitly preserves those rights during 
declared public emergencies [8]. During the EVD out-
break, these countries’ emergency declarations revised 
their legal landscapes to permit a broader scope of public 
health and enforcement measures, particularly in three 
areas: enhanced health surveillance, disposition of the 
dead, and isolation and quarantine practices.
Enhanced health surveillance
The EVD outbreak remained rampant in West Africa 
for 6–8 months before actual surveillance was launched 
in order to monitor the spread of the disease [9]. While 
internationally most countries carried out some level of 
EVD screening and monitoring, Guinea, Sierra Leone, 
and Liberia eventually implemented mandatory health 
checkpoints and house-to-house searches to conduct 
contact investigations, and developed and enforced strict 
penalties, including jail time, for those violating public 
health orders [7].
The implementation of these health surveillance 
efforts, particularly resource heavy functions such as 
contact investigations, suffered due to inadequate inves-
tigation teams, health service availability, and sharply ris-
ing death tolls. The lack of established surveillance, early 
warning systems, and initial misdiagnosis of EVD cases 
contributed to the scope of the outbreak.
Disposition of the dead
All three countries also required specific methods of 
death reporting and disposition. Liberia required crema-
tion of EVD victims, while Guinea and Sierra Leone man-
dated all deaths be reported and restricted transportation 
of decedents. These public health orders were enforced 
with fines, quarantines, and even jail time. In Guinea, 
for example, six people were prosecuted for violating the 
country’s emergency declaration by transporting a dece-
dent EVD victim in a taxicab [10].
Isolation and quarantine practices
In addition to enhanced surveillance, Guinea, Sierra 
Leone, and Liberia instituted a range of isolation and 
quarantine practices, though many were implemented 
months after the EVD outbreak began. Policy in Liberia 
and Sierra Leone was to quarantine households with an 
exposed, confirmed, probable, or suspected case for up 
to 21 days even without displaying symptoms [11]. Two 
negative lab tests from the original suspected case were 
required to clear quarantine [8]. Quarantine and isola-
tion measures were strictly enforced by military and law 
enforcement.
All three countries’ emergency declarations required 
closures of borders and certain public spaces, such as 
schools and markets [7]. Liberia and Sierra Leone banned 
mass gatherings and closed government offices. In 
response to high prevalence in certain neighborhoods, all 
three countries mass quarantined portions of their popu-
lation based on geographic location rather than exposure 
or symptomology. Sierra Leone instituted a 3 days lock-
down in September 2014 during which all residents—
regardless of exposure—were required to remain in their 
residences [7]. Guinea isolated the population in areas 
with more than a 70 percent infection rate using police 
and military assets, while Liberia quarantined West 
Point, one of the country’s poorest and most densely 
populated neighborhoods [7].
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USA:
They would see pictures of West Africans, be they in 
Liberia, Sierra Leone or Guinea – lying on the street, 
bodies there not getting picked up – and they said, 
‘Oh my God, is this what’s going to happen in the 
U.S.?’
Dr. Anthony Fauci, Director of the National Institute 
of Allergy and Infectious Disease [12]
Much like the constitutions of Guinea, Sierra Leone, 
and Liberia, the authority of federal and state govern-
ments in the United States derives from the United States 
Constitution. While both federal and state governments 
have isolation and quarantine powers, state govern-
ments are the main authority for implementing public 
health measures to protect the health, safety, and welfare 
of persons within their borders [5]. Under this system of 
federalism, state public health measures may clash with 
federal guidelines and policies.
Enhanced health surveillance
Surveillance measures focused on travelers, including 
many returning health care workers, from West Africa. 
According to the 2015 Federal Emergency Management 
agency (FEMA) National Preparedness Report, U.S. 
Customs and Border Protection (CBP) screened 6846 
total passengers arriving from affected countries [13]. 
The Centers for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC) 
issued guidance regarding the recommended health sur-
veillance measures based on four categories of risk—high 
risk, some risk, low (but not zero) risk, and no identifi-
able risk [14]. These categories determined the type and 
level of health monitoring and movement restrictions 
state and local health departments should implement 
during the 21  day incubation period of the virus [14]. 
Most health care workers returning from West Africa 
were considered to have some risk, which required direct 
active monitoring, including daily monitoring of symp-
toms and assessment of any potential travel, as well as a 
potential restriction of movement [14, 15].
Disposition of the dead
Due to the high risk of transmission involved in post-
mortem care settings, the CDC outlined protocols for 
handling EVD-related deaths in the United States. This 
guidance directs trained personnel not to do the follow-
ing when disposing of a body infected with EVD: clean 
or wash, embalm, remove any inserted medical equip-
ment from the body, or perform an autopsy [16]. The 
first EVD-related death in the United States required 
that the decedent’s body remain unwashed, wrapped in 
a plastic shroud, and then placed into a zippered leak-
proof bag. Ultimately, the transportation of the body was 
coordinated by the CDC and local transportation author-
ities to a mortuary for cremation [17].
Isolation and quarantine practices
The health surveillance measures put in place by most 
state and local public health entities required some meas-
ure of quarantine, and confirmed cases of EVD were 
isolated [18]. While the CDC guidance recommended 
against forced or mass isolation and quarantine orders 
to avoid violating civil liberties, under the current frame-
work of public health laws, states were free to follow the 
CDC guidance or implement more stringent policies in 
place [19–21]. New York and New Jersey (and many oth-
ers [22]), for example, enacted far stricter public health 
measures than those recommended by the CDC, requir-
ing that all those returning from West Africa with any 
level of EVD exposure be placed in a mandatory quaran-
tine, regardless of symptoms or the lack thereof [23, 24]. 
The case of Kaci Hickox, a healthcare worker who volun-
teered in West Africa, illustrated the civil liberties issues 
that may arise with forced public health orders. Eventu-
ally, the state court in Hickox’s home state of Maine ruled 
against forced quarantine because the restriction of her 
freedom of movement was not warranted in accord-
ance with CDC guidance regarding disease transmission 
prevention.
Australia and Canada:
The spirit of IHR is that the measures need to be 
commensurate and there shouldn’t be any restric-
tions in international travel if not recommended by 
an emergency committee.
Dr. Isabelle Nuttall, Head of the WHO’s Global 
Capacities Alert and Response department, on blan-
ket travels bans enacted [25]
Australia and Canada have similar medical treatment 
and infrastructure as the United States; nonetheless, 
the same fears about EVD occupied both countries and 
informed public health policies during the height of the 
EVD outbreak. While the United States had confirmed 
EVD cases, Canada and Australia had none [26, 27].
Enhanced health surveillance
Under the Public Health Agency, Canada issued guide-
lines regarding the monitoring and movement of people 
travelling from West Africa. These guidelines included 
two main categories—travelers without symptoms and 
travelers with symptoms [28]. Travelers without symp-
toms were grouped into high risk and low risk groups, 
depending on whether there had been direct contact 
with EVD patients and the amount of personal protec-
tive gear worn, and were advised to self-monitor and 
report any planned travel if low risk, or be monitored 
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for symptoms and self-isolate if high risk [6]. Humani-
tarian workers were placed in their own category sim-
ilar to the low risk, with the caveat that self-isolation 
would be required if, for example, there was a known 
breach in their personal protective equipment [28]. 
Public health officials and aid groups who were fear-
ful of a stricter policy welcomed this federal policy as 
it provided flexibility [29], and provinces like Ontario 
followed the federal guidelines [30].
Isolation and quarantine practices
Australia and Canada’s isolation and quarantine meas-
ures focused on entry into the country. These flexible 
and reasonable guidelines for humanitarian workers 
stood in contrast with Canada’s actions concerning bor-
der control. In contrast to WHO guidelines, Canada 
stopped processing new and pending visa applications 
from Sierra Leone, Guinea, and Liberia, and applica-
tions of those who were in the above countries 3 months 
prior to the application being received [31–33]. These 
measures effectively closed the Canadian border and 
were arguably unnecessary as the public health risk to 
Canada was very low [34].
Australia was the first developed country to close its 
borders in response to EVD [35]. Under section 51(ix) of 
the Australian Constitution, the Commonwealth has the 
power over the states regarding quarantine. The Bios-
ecurity Bill 2014 was introduced during the EVD out-
break in West Africa, and it aimed to prevent the spread 
of diseases such as EVD. Furthermore, the Biosecurity 
Bill grants a health department official the authority to 
force anyone with signs or symptoms of a listed disease 
to practice voluntary isolation or face arrest [36]. On 
October 28, 2014, Australia suspended visa assessments 
for applications from citizens from Sierra Leone, Liberia, 
and Guinea, cancelling non-permanent or temporary 
visas [37, 38].
In addition, Australia suspended its humanitarian pro-
gram and stopped accepting West African refugees [38, 
39]. Those with permanent visas who had not yet come 
to the country were asked to submit to a mandatory 
21 day quarantine period once they arrived, regardless of 
their exposure history [38, 40]. Australia refused to send 
health workers to support the EVD response in Africa, 
citing the long distance and travel between the affected 
areas and Australia would make it very difficult for the 
evacuation of such workers if they became infected with 
EVD [41, 42].
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Conclusion and recommendations
Western countries are creating mass panic which 
is unhelpful in containing a contagious disease like 
Ebola.
Ofwono Opondo, Ugandan government spokesman, 
in response to Australia’s visa suspension policy [35]
During the EVD crisis, governments implemented pub-
lic health laws with mixed results. The delayed imple-
mentation of comprehensive, EVD-specific public health 
measures in West Africa required that the measures 
themselves be implemented on a larger, more extreme 
scale. Just as EVD causes long-term health effects in sur-
vivors, strict public health orders, such as mandatory iso-
lation and quarantine, business and school closures, and 
travel bans, have immediate and lasting consequences 
on the affected individuals and communities [43]. 
For instance, the use of mass quarantine immediately 
restricted people’s rights to liberty and freedom and cre-
ated large-scale food and shelter scarcity and civil unrest. 
School attendance remains very low [43]. Health service 
delivery has seen a 23  % decrease, and other essential 
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services like water and sanitation experience continued 
disruption [14]. Additionally, EVD survivors and their 
families face discrimination in their communities; some 
survivors report having to move [28]. While the effects 
would vary from jurisdiction to jurisdiction, possible 
long-term ramifications of similar public health measures 
must be considered when developing response policies 
and procedures.
In the United States, the well-established stories of the 
ten confirmed EVD cases as well as Kaci Hickox dem-
onstrate that while public health laws and policies are 
in place, influences such as political realities, fear, and 
unclear jurisdictional delineation can create uneven and 
haphazard public health protection. Similar to the United 
States’ divergence from WHO guidelines, Australia and 
Canada implemented policy seemingly based on pub-
lic reaction and fear. All three countries implemented 
response measures similar in many ways to the measures 
enacted in the worst affected countries, despite the lower 
incidence and prevalence of EVD.
While the principles of sovereignty, and in the United 
States, the police power, certainly grant jurisdictions the 
authority to implement a wide range of measures to pro-
tect public health and prevent transmission of diseases, 
including mandatory isolation and quarantine orders, 
blanket travel bans, and other restrictions, these powers 
should be implemented based on the best knowledge and 
practices of medical science, not public panic. The key to 
addressing a global public health crisis like the EVD out-
break is adopting a uniform, evidence-based approach 
and ultimately controlling the crisis at its source. Since 
laws regulating public health emergencies and orders are 
not frequently activated except in large or well-publicized 
incidents, and often have not been updated to reflect 
evolving best practices and developments in technology, 
reexamination of these laws and regulations is critical 
to avoid violations of civil liberties and long-term rami-
fications, as well as the undermining of ongoing public 
health and humanitarian operations.
A few recommendations for future public health emer-
gencies include:
1. Governments should employ the least restrictive 
means necessary—on the basis of the best available 
scientific evidence—in implementing isolation or 
quarantine measures
2. There should be increased transparency and the pro-
motion of communication between centralized agen-
cies/organizations and localities in order to better 
streamline policies and public health surveillance.
3. All governments after a public health emergency 
and before the next emergency should make a bet-
ter determination of the national hospital capacity to 
handle infectious disease patients and try to address 
the gaps found.
4. Governments should review their laws and authori-
ties for quarantine and isolation and make any neces-
sary changes to strengthen just enforcement.
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